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Agency and the Unincorporated Firm:
Reflections on Design on the
Same Plane of Interest
Deborah A. DeMott"
Regardless of their legal form, all firms confront questions of gover-
nance, that is, the recurrence of situations that may not be resolved satisfac-
torily if their resolution is left solely to the discretion of individual actors.
Two principal reasons explain the inevitability of governance questions
within firms. First, the interests of persons involved with the firm may
diverge. In particular, the interests of owners and managers, and of owners
and creditors, do not always coincide. Even among themselves, owners'
interests may well diverge. Second, the firm benefits over time through the
existence of a structure that defines the ability of individual actors to take
action that binds the firm and its owners, as well as some mechanism,
whether direct or indirect, to control the conduct of people whose actions
bear consequences for the firm and its owners. The law of agency provides
a set of doctrines that underlie the mechanisms of firm governance.
My purpose in this Article is to illustrate recurrent aspects of unincor-
porated firms that generate governance problems, problems formally
addressed by agency-law norms, but troublesome in practical respects none-
theless. Many unincorporated firms have internal governance structures
that are insufficiently differentiated in function to resolve predictable diffi-
culties with the clarity achieved by governance structures that differentiate
more extensively among the functions of persons associated with the firm.
Agency-law norms resolve these difficulties by providing formal answers
to them, but the theoretical and practical challenges are often greater than
in firms in which functions are more differentiated. In many unincorpo-
* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. I am grateful to Melanie Dun-
shee for her work in obtaining the illustration that accompanies this Article and to Joseph
Bankman, William Bratton, William Callison, and Larry Ribstein for their comments on an
earlier draft. This Article is based on an address presented at the Washington and Lee
University School of Law on November 15, 1996, in connection with The Future of the
Unincorporated Firm Symposium.
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rated firms, the same people occupy multiple roles - equity ownership,
management, employment - rather than distinctive roles. Lack of differen-
tiation in function often leads to instability in small firms. The legal
consequences of incorporation themselves specify various differentiations
in function,1 some of which could be, but often are not, replicated in
unincorporated firms. Lack of differentiation helps explain some of the
distinctiveness in legal norms applicable to unincorporated firms. In a more
speculative mode, I suggest that the persistence of such governance chal-
lenges in unincorporated firms may limit firm growth, particularly growth
funded through external sources of equity investment.
My inquiry begins with a visual metaphor intended to reflect a baseline
assumption about many unincorporated firms, which is that from the
standpoint of issues relevant to agency, the design of many such firms
places all actors on the same plane of interest. This feature is a defining
visual quality in many works of art, in particular, work that preceded the
Italian Renaissance or later work that does not evidence its influence. My
specific illustration comes from Antonio Pisano, known as Pisanello, who
worked in-the first half of the fifteenth century. Consider the organization
of visual experience in Pisanello's masterpiece, The Vision of Saint
Eustace.2 To be sure, the center of the painting depicts the Saint and his
vision of Christ on the Cross. But there is so much else as well - a large
stag with handsome antlers, a smaller stag with an even more impressive
set of antlers, finely detailed equipment on the Saint's horse, elegant
clothing on the Saint himself, a dog chasing a hare, other dogs awaiting
their chance, what appears to be a bear, various birds, and much, much
more. Each might capture the viewer's attention as readily as any other.
Of this painting in particular, and of Pisanello's style more generally,
the influential art historian, Bernard Berenson, wrote:
The art of Pisanello, like that of the early Flemings, was too naive. In
their delight in nature they were like children who, on making the first
spring excursion into the neighbouring meadow and wood, pluck all the
wild flowers, trap all the birds, hug all the trees, and make friends with
all the gay-coloured creeping things in the grass. Everything is on the
same plane of interest ..
1. See CHARLES R. O'KELLEY, JR. & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND
OHER BusiNEss ASSOCIATIONS 499-501 (2d ed. 1996); Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking
Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate Participants for Torts of the
Enterprise, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1994).
2. Figure 1. One can access this image through http://www.yawp.com/cjackson.
3. BERNARD BERENSON, THE ITALIAN PAINTERS OF THE RENAISSANCE 143-44 (1952).
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In equally didactic terms, Berenson also articulated criteria by which
to identify more mature artistic expression:
The larger part of human progress consists in exchanging naive conven-
tionality for conscious law; and it is not otherwise with art. Instead of
painting indiscriminately everything that appeals to him, the great artist,
as with deliberate intention, selects from among the mass of visual
impressions only those elements that combine to produce a picture in
which each part of the design conveys tactile values, communicates
movement, and uplifts with space-composition. 4
In short, all is no longer on the same plane of interest: consciously con-
structed hierarchy and structure have been imposed, and the artistic work
that results is more than, and apart from, a conscientious and undifferenti-
ated replication of the artist's visual impressions.
I turn now to a series of examples of firms situated such that, in one
respect or another, actors appear to be on the same plane of interest.
Consider first the allocation of authority among partners within a general
partnership. Under Section 9(1) of the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA),
"[e]very partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its busi-
ness, and the act of every partner . . . for apparently carrying on in the
usual way the business of the partnership... binds the partnership" unless
the partner lacks actual authority to do the act in question and the person
with whom the partner deals is aware of the partner's lack of actual author-
ity.' Section 301 of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) is
similar, with one exception not relevant for our present purposes.' In a
general partnership, in short, ownership and authority are not differentiated
from each other. Likewise, in a member-managed limited liability company
(LLC), ownership and authority generally converge.7
4. Id. at 145.
5. UNi. PARTNERsHiP ACT (1914) (UPA) § 9(1), 6 U.L.A. 400 (1995).
6. REVISED UNIF. PARTNERstuP ACT (1994) (RUPA) § 301, 6 U.L.A. 33 (1995).
The exception concerns a partnership that has filed a statement of partnership authority with
the state. Section 303 permits such statements to designate partners' authority and any limits
upon it. The Section creates conclusive rights to rely on such statements in specified
instances and deems a third party to have knowledge of a limitation on a partner's
authority - when the person is not relying on a filed statement of authority - only as to
limits on a partner's authority to transfer real estate and only when the limitation on
authority is filed with real property records.
7. See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, LIMITED LiAB LrrY ComPAmEs
§ 8.06 (1996). In some states the position is not entirely clear. For example, Delaware's
LLC statute provides that in an LLC, "[u]nless otherwise provided in a limited liability
company agreement, each member and manager has the authority to bind the limited liability
company." DEL. CoDEANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (1993 & Supp. 1996). This provision would
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That each owner has at least apparent authority to bind a general
partnership and a member-managed LLC creates an evident risk for all
owners and for the firm's creditors. Agency law, of course, enables the
other members to sue the rogue member who acts in excess of his actual
authority, or who commits an unauthorized tort or crime while acting in
partnership business,' but success in that suit does not vitiate the liability
incurred on behalf of the firm. Moreover, owners of firms are not equally
talented, or necessarily talented at all, in running the firm's business. Thus,
the risk is not simply that the firm will be bound to a transaction entered
into by an agent not actually authorized, but that the firm will be disadvan-
taged through a transaction that an appropriately skilled agent would not
have undertaken.
In contrast, incorporating a firm differentiates as a baseline matter
between ownership and authority to act on the firm's behalf.9 Shareholders
may undertake to act as the firm's agents, but the baseline rules contributed
by legal form do not accredit all of them with the appearance of authority.
Statutory specification and agency-law doctrines together allocate authority
to bind a corporation. Authority to bind the corporation typically resides in
its officers, who usually are appointed by its directors," ° but directors' assent
appear to make restrictions on authority controlling on third parties. Read in its entirety, this
Section of the statute leaves one a bit uncertain about the consequences of transactions
undertaken by a member who is apparently authorized to act, but who lacks authority under
the LLC agreement when the other party is unaware of the limitation in the agreement. Earlier
language in the Section states that:
Unless otherwise provided in a limited liability company agreement, the management
of a limited liability company shall be vested in its members in proportion to the then
current percentage or other interests of members in the profits of the limited liability
company owned by all of the members, the decision of members holding more than
50 percent of the said percentage or other interest in the profits controlling ....
Id. Does this initial "unless otherwise provided" refer only to the prospect of changing the
managerial prerogatives created by the statute, or does it additionally make any specification
of authority in the agreement (including limitations on authority) conclusive against all third
parties, including ones who lack knowledge of the limitation? If the initial proviso in the
section is read narrowly, so might the later proviso be read only to validate an election to
allocate management exclusively to a manager. See also Mitchel Hampton Boles & Susan
Pace Hamill, Agency Powers and Fiduciary Duties Under the Alabama Limited Liability
Company Act: Suggestions for Future Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 143, 148-51 (1996) (identify-
ing possible disputes over authority in LLCs).
8. Any agent owes the principal a duty to act only as authorized. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 383 (1958). The agent is liable to the principal for loss caused by
the breach of any duty. Id. § 401.
9. Moreover, a corporation is not the agent of its sole or majority shareholder simply
on the basis of the fact of share ownership. Id. § 14 M.
10. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142 (1991). The Delaware statute does not
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may be required for major transactions. Depending on the size of the
corporation, the nature of its business, and the nature of the transaction,
nonofficer managers may have authority to transact. Fundamental transac-
tions by statute require a resolution adopted by directors followed by
shareholders' assent. Details aside, the picture is one of centralization and
hierarchy in the allocation of authority.
Firms in which authority to act is broadly allocated to all owners -
like general partnerships and member-managed LLCs - present greater
challenges to control mechanisms than do firms structured to differentiate
between ownership and authority."' In the absence of hierarchy imposed by
legal form, more of the work of control turns on the efficacy of internal
systems to monitor agents' activities. Individual owners have a greater stake
in the efficacy of these systems when they are individually liable for the
firm's obligations, and they have a lesser stake when their risk is limited to
their ownership interest in the firm itself.'2
foreclose the possibility of having officers chosen by shareholders if the corporation's bylaws
so provide. Id. § 142(b). In contrast, the New York statute requires that shareholder selection
of officers be authorized in the corporation's certificate of incorporation. N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 715(b) (McKinney 1986). The Revised Model Business Corporation Act does not
explicitly resolve the question. See REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT (RMBCA) § 8.40(a)
(1986) (providing that corporation "has the officers described in its bylaws or appointed by the
board of directors in accordance with the bylaws").
11. A related point has been made in the realm of political theory. Within a social
relationship, if each member's actions may be ascribed to all other members, "we have not
representation but 'solidarity,' as exemplified in vendettas, blood feuds, or reprisals." HANNA
F. PmuKN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 40 (1967) (drawing on work of Max Weber to
distinguish condition of solidarity from representation, in which only select members of group
have authority to act for it).
12. Individual liability also enhances incentives to insure, see Thompson, supra note 1,
at 37, and the past and prospective efficacy of internal control mechanisms should bear on the
level of insurance premiums, cf. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 54 (1991) (noting that firms engaging in risky
activities will pay higher insurance premiums).
The relative novelty of the LLC as an organizational form means that the strength of
members' limited liability has yet to be fully tested in litigation. Consider the consequences
of the partnership origins of the LLC for liability questions that arise once an LLC dissolves.
Like a partnership agreement, an LLC's operating agreement may provide for automatic
dissolution upon the happening of a specified event. UNIF. LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT
(ULLCA) § 801(b)(1), 6A U.L.A. 481 (1995). Thereafter, although the LLC "continues"
only for the purpose of winding up, the LLC is bound on nonwinding-up transactions that
would have been binding on it prior to the dissolution, unless the other party to the transaction
has notice of the dissolution. Although a dissolved and wound-up LLC may file articles of
termination with the state, dissolution may occur much earlier. See id. § 805. The conse-
quence is a classic instance of the lingering apparent authority of the now-dissolved LLC's
agents, in particular its managers or members. In contrast, a corporation's dissolution is not
effective until articles of dissolution are filed with the state. See RMBCA § 14.03(b).
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My second example of lack of differentiation is related but distinctive.
In many unincorporated firms, especially those providing professional
services, ownership and work (or employment) are not differentiated. The
investment risk that an ownership interest in a firm represents is not differ-
entiated from the context in which the professional-as-owner practices her
profession. This combination of roles within the firm can have untoward
consequences separate from the illiquidity of the investment itself.
13
Courts' willingness to articulate and apply a stringent form of fiduciary
duty in such firms may well be a response to the enhanced risk created by
a lack of differentiation. Like Mr. Beasley, formerly of Cadwalader,
Wickersham & Taft, a partner expelled from such a firm as a result of his
partners' breach of fiduciary duty has been deprived not just of the fruits
of a financial investment, but of an accustomed professional setting as
well.' 4
The salient question is whether members in a dissolved but not yet terminated LLC
are individually liable on pretermination transactions when the LLC does nothing to give
notice of its dissolution. A third party might well argue that when the LLC dissolved
without notice to the public, the members' shield against partnership-style individual liability
evaporated. After all, the limited liability firm in which the members invested has dis-
solved! The LLC itself may not have "terminated," see ULLCA § 805(b), but the third
party might argue that its nontermination only establishes the LLC's liability and does not
address the members' individual liability. Statutory provisions stating that the obligations
of an LLC are "solely" those of the company, see id. § 303(a), do not address members'
liability that arguably arises once the LLC itself, in some legally relevant sense, no longer
exists. Moreover, these issues are even more pressing in jurisdictions with LLC statutes
that define dissolution and create the prospect of automatic or nonpublic dissolution but do
not differentiate between dissolution and termination. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-6-
01 (1993). That is, if the LLC is organized under a statute that specifies circumstances
under which it will dissolve, but does not specify a separate condition of termination,
members' individual liability for postdissolution acts is a substantial risk.
13. A minority investment interest in a small firm may be illiquid when the investor
is otherwise passive. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 518
(Mass. 1975).
14. See Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, No. CL-94-8646 "AJ," 1996 WL
438777 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 23, 1996). The Cadwalader partnership agreement did not
contain a mechanism to expel a partner without cause. In the absence of such a mechanism
in the agreement, an alternative route for an at-will partnership is dissolution, followed by
reformation as a partnership consisting of prior members save those being excluded. This
alternative has been characterized as "at best, cumbersome and, at worst, laden with risk."
See ROBERT W. HiLLMAN, HILLMAN ON LAWYER MOBILITY § 5.4.1, at 5:19 (1994). In
cases like Beasley, when the partnership agreement contains no relevant provision, dissolu-
tion entitles the expelled partner to a judicial forum in which to contest the valuation of his
interest. By statute, the excluded partner has a right to an accounting of his interest in the
partnership, that is, to his proportionate share of its assets net of liabilities. See, e.g.,
Dawson v. White & Case, 672 N.E.2d 589, 592-94 (N.Y. 1996) (finding that agreement
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In short, the relative stringency of member-to-member fiduciary duties
in this context reflects the enhanced risks that follow lack of differentiation
in function. Corporate norms, in contrast, presuppose that the shareholder-
to-shareholder relationship is an atomistic one, in which shareholders are
not understood to represent each other as agents. Shareholders owe each
other no duties, at least in the absence of a controlling shareholder who
exercises control over the firm's operation or who self-deals with the firm.
Such a shareholder, though, is not simply a shareholder; the exercise of
operational control ventures beyond the differentiated role of an equity
investor defined by corporate law.
To be sure, the same lack of differentiation can occur just as readily
in closely held corporations. Shareholders in small corporations, like part-
ners in professional service firms, often have employment as well as
investment relationships with the corporation. Case law addressing this fact
reflects disagreement over the normative significance properly ascribed to
the formal fact of incorporation. In particular, leading cases indicate that
courts fundamentally disagree about whether fiduciary constraints apply to
limit the discretion of controlling shareholders to cause the corporation to
terminate the employment of a minority shareholder. A recent Delaware
case, Riblet Products Corp. v. Nagy, 5 completely severs employment-
related issues from the duties that a corporation's controlling shareholders
owe a minority shareholder. 6 In contrast, several Massachusetts cases hold
controlling shareholders to a duty of utmost good faith and fair dealing that
extends to decisions to terminate the employment of minority sharehold-
ers.' 7 In Delaware case law, the formal fact of incorporation trumps any
normative significance that might be ascribed to the functional similarity
between the minority shareholder's situation and that of a member of a
partnership.' 8
among partners excluded goodwill as distributable asset; future payments under unfunded
pension plan were not liability of firm in dissolution, but were properly characterized as
profitability-contingent expenses of successor firm).
15. 683 A.2d 37 (Del. 1996).
16. Riblet Prods. Corp. v. Nagy, 683 A.2d 37, 37-40 (Del. 1996).
17. See, e.g., King v. Driscoll, 638 N.E.2d 488, 494 (Mass. 1994); Wilkes v. Spring-
side Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 662 (Mass. 1976). This principle applies in
Massachusetts even when the termination of a shareholder's employment occurred pursuant
to the terms of an agreement mandating sale of the stock when employment ends. See King,
638 N.E.2d at 494.
18. q. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380 (Del. 1993) (declining to differenti-
ate between legal norms applicable to closely and publicly held corporations, especially
when parties did not elect to be classified as statutory close corporation). The preference
that Delaware case law exhibits for form-based answers is a relatively consistent theme
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One virtue of formalism in this connection is that it obviates the
inevitable and difficult inquiry into the content of rules specifically applica-
ble to closely held corporations or other corporations in which functions are
less differentiated than in a publicly held corporation. Consider a corpora-
tion in which the shareholders, all farmers, sell their grain output to the
corporation and receive production financing from it. This scenario con-
flates equity ownership with debtor-creditor and commercial buyer-seller
relationships. Does the fact that the shareholders' position is undifferenti-
ated or undiversified change the nature of the directors' fiduciary duty of
care? In Brane v. Roth, 9 the court held that the directors breached their
duty of care by failing to hedge against price changes in the commodity
outputs sold to the corporation by its shareholders.' From the standpoint
of modem financial theory, it is odd to think that directors are under a duty
to hedge against such risks because shareholders themselves could hedge or
diversify against them.2 The outcome in Brane is also surprising in light
throughout its corporate jurisprudence, regardless of transactional or relational context.
Consider Delaware's treatment of fundamental corporate transactions. Delaware rejects the
"de facto merger" doctrine, which enables a court to characterize as a merger a transaction
that the parties have structured through an alternative mode available under the corporate
statute. See, e.g., Hariton v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 188 A.2d 123, 125 (Del. 1963). As a
result, transactions carrying identical economic consequences have disparate consequences
for shareholders, depending on the transactional vehicle chosen by the directors and
managers who structured the transaction. Under the Delaware statute, for example, merger
transactions may trigger appraisal rights for shareholders, whereas sales of assets never do.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251, 262, 271 (1991 & Supp. 1996). On occasion,
Delaware's formalism has the effect of expanding rather than contracting shareholders'
entitlements. In a recent - and controversial - opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court
defined minority shareholders' entitlements in the context of a two-step negotiated acquisi-
tion transaction, one in which a cash tender offer was followed by a cash-for-shares merger,
both at the same price. See James C. Freund & Edward F. Greene, Substance over Form
S-14: A Proposal to Reform SEC Reguation of Negotiated Acquisitions, 36 Bus. LAW. 1483,
1499-1505 (1981). In Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 298 (Del. 1996),
the court held that minority shareholders who dissented from the second-step merger and
sought appraisal of their shares were entitled to their proportionate share of the value of the
enterprise as a going concern as of the date of the merger. This rule enabled minority
shareholders to receive a proportionate share of elements of provable value added prior to
the merger by the corporation's majority shareholder, who achieved that position through
the tender offer that constituted the first step of the acquisition plan. The rule gives
operative legal effect to the formal distinction between the tender offer and the merger, even
though both were undertaken as steps in the same plan of acquisition.
19. 590 N.E.2d 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
20. Brane v. Roth, 590 N.E.2d 587, 590-92 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
21. See Henry T.C. Hu, Hedging Expectations: "Derivative Reality" and the Law and
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of the breadth of the contemporary business judgment rule, which protects
directors from liability for the consequences of decisions made in good faith
on an informed basis, so long as the directors do not have a conflict-of-
interest.' Nonetheless, it is unsurprising that a court might impose a duty
to hedge when, as in Brane, the conflation of relationships enhances share-
holders' risks well beyond conventional risks of equity investment.
My final example is the failure of many unincorporated firms to
differentiate a distinctive monitoring function from either ownership or
operational management. Limited partnerships, or LLCs organized as
investment vehicles, are intriguing in this respect. Limited partnership
statutes differentiate between ownership and authority to bind the firm by
allocating to the general partner all of a partner's rights and powers, subject
to any contrary or restrictive provision in the statute or the limited partner-
ship agreement.' Although comparable rights of limited partners are not
specified by statute, limited partners are not liable for the firm's obligations
unless they participate in the control of its business.'
On the governance front, and in contrast to corporate statutes,21 limited
partnership statutes do not impose any requirement of periodic election on
the general partner's continuity as manager.' Moreover, because the
general partner itself is the manager, limited partnership statutes do not
create the structural possibility of differentiating the function of operational
management from the function of monitoring management's efficacy and
probity. In particular, limited partnership statutes do not permit the part-
nership agreement to reduce the liability to third parties borne by a general
partner, thereby foreclosing the possibility of variations in such liability
among general partners.' As a consequence, the general partner whose
duties were restricted to monitoring other general partners would confront
22. See AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOvERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c) (1992).
23. REvIsED UNuF. LITmD PARTNERSHip ACT (RULPA) § 403(a) (1976), 6A U.L.A.
177 (1995).
24. Id. § 303(a). Subsection (b) specifies a number of actions that do not constitute
participation in control. Id. § 303(b). Even a limited partner who participates in control
is, under subsection (a), liable only to third parties who transact with the firm "reasonably
believing, based upon the limited partner's conduct, that the limited partner is a general
partner." Id. § 303(a).
25. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (1991) (requiring annual stockholder
meeting to elect directors).
26. Limited partnership statutes leave to the partnership agreement the specification
of circumstances that would require a general partner to withdraw. See RULPA § 603.
27. See id. § 403(b). In contrast, a general partner's liability to the partnership and
its other members may be addressed in the agreement. Id.
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the same degree of liability to third parties. Corporation statutes, by
mandating a shareholder-elected board of directors, create a structure in
which it is at least theoretically possible to distinguish a monitoring function
from management and to invest that function in directors who are not
themselves corporate officers or employees involved in operational manage-
ment, and who, unlike general partners, do not bear the risk of liability on
all of the firm's obligations to third parties simply by virtue of their posi-
tion as directors. In addition, directors are authorized and obligated by
statute to intervene when the circumstances warrant. Although this institu-
tion has flaws - individual outside directors may not always be exemplary
in their service as monitors - the point is that the governance structure
implicit in limited partnership statutes does not differentiate monitoring
from managing.'
Likewise, the great majority of LLC statutes do not compel or explic-
itly contemplate a division between managing and monitoring,' a pattern
to which the Minnesota statute is a noteworthy exception.30 Even the
28. Case law recognizes this point, at least implicitly. Consider the body of cases
addressing issues incident to derivative actions brought by limited partners on behalf of
limited partnerships. See id. §§ 1001-1004. If the limited partner makes a demand on the
general partner prior to filing the action, Delaware does not treat the making of the demand
as a concession of the general partner's independence. See Seaforth Funding Ltd. Partner-
ship v. M & M Assocs. II, L.P., 672 A.2d 66, 71 (Del. Ch. 1995). In the parallel
corporate context, a consequence of making a demand is conceding the directors' independ-
ence to address the content of the demand. See Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 775-76
(Del. 1990). This rule presupposes "a reasoned vote of a majority of individuals constitut-
ing a board of directors." Seaforth Funding, 672 A.2d at 71.
29. In the Delaware LLC statute, for example, an LLC that is not managed by its
members would be managed by a manager "who shall be chosen by the members in the
manner provided in the limited liability company agreement." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-
402 (Supp. 1996). An LLC may have more than one manager. See id.
30. The Minnesota LLC statute expressly differentiates a monitoring function from
operating management unless members of the LLC elect by unanimous vote to have
member-management. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.606 (West 1995). In a number of
respects, its salient provisions resemble those of a corporation statute. The corporate-like
characteristics of this statute and of the structure it mandates for LLCs would reduce its
attractiveness to parties who desire the simpler and flatter structure mandated by partnership
statutes and contemplated by most LLC statutes. Unless all the members elect member-
management, the Minnesota statute invests in a board of governors the authority to manage
or direct the management of the LLC's business and affairs. Id. A majority of governors
present at a meeting may remove a manager at any time. Id. § 322B.686(2). The board
of governors may have one or more members, as fixed in the LLC's articles of organization
or operating agreement. Id. § 322B.61. Governors must be natural persons and must be
elected in accordance with provisions in the articles or operating agreement. Id.
§ 322B.613. Fixed terms specified for governors may not exceed five years; governors may
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Delaware LLC statute, which explicitly embodies a policy "to give the
maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforce-
ability of [LLC] agreements," 31 appears to contemplate only an undifferenti-
ated management function. 2 Monitoring in such firms, then, tends to be
an incident of ownership; a prospective equity investor monitors before
investing by choosing to invest in a particular firm with a particular set of
managers and monitors thereafter on the basis of available information, with
the possibility of seeking after-the-fact remedies against perceived miscon-
duct.33 The absence of an ongoing mechanism to monitor and intervene on
behalf of investors would be a basis on which courts, examining managers'
behavior after the fact, might justify the imposition of stringent fiduciary
standards. These justifications are weakened - or at least called into
question - by agreed-to advance specifications of actors' roles and entitle-
be selected to fill vacancies by a majority of the remaining governors, but a governor so
selected serves until the members select a qualified successor at their next annual or special
meeting. Id. §§ 322B.616, 322B.64. The statute specifies a standard of conduct for gov-
ernors and provides that a governor is not liable if that standard of conduct has been met.
Id. § 322B.663. In substantive respects, this Section of the LLC statute tracks the counter-
part language in Minnesota's Business Corporation Act, see id. § 302A.251, including
language permitting directors to consider the interests of nonshareholder constituents in
considering the corporation's best interests, see id. § 302A.251(5). It is unlikely that
sophisticated equity investors would be attracted to a structure that, by statute, permitted
LLC governors to prefer the interests of nonequity holder constituents to those of LLC
members, unless these investors were comfortable with the composition of the board of
governors.
31. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (1993).
32. The statute does not forbid an attempt to differentiate monitoring from manage-
ment in the LLC agreement. The agreement could specify different duties for different
managers, a prospect the statute does not expressly permit, but does not prohibit. See, e.g.,
id. § 18-110 1(c)(2) (providing that "the member's or manager's.., duties and liabilities
may be expanded or restricted" in LLC agreement); id. § 18-402 (providing that "[t]he
manager shall ... hold the offices and have the responsibilities accorded to him by the
members and set forth" in LLC agreement). Likewise, on the same reasoning, the agree-
ment could specify different selection mechanisms for different managers. See id. (provid-
ing that in manager-managed LLC, management to extent provided in LLC agreement "shall
be vested in the manager who shall be chosen by the member in the manner provided" in
LLC agreement). It is interesting nonetheless that the lengthy sample operating agreement
in the leading treatise on the subject does not attempt such a differentiation in function. See
PUBsEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 7, at app. A-31 (providing that "[elach member-manager
has the power to bind the Company.").
33. Commentators suggest that in a manager-managed LLC, members retain authority
"to amend the articles of organization or take other important actions without the managers'
approval" unless the LLC agreement provides otherwise. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra
note 7, at 8-35. Such retained authority would not, however, support interference in
ongoing business decisions made by the manager.
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ments of the sort contained in many partnership and LLC agreements. By
restricting individual actors' discretion, such specifications structure the
relationship in a fashion not identical to the formal consequences of incor-
poration, but sufficiently similar to ground arguments for the relaxation of
fiduciary norms.
Consider now one of the leading puzzles raised by choices among
available organizational forms, which is the predominant use of the corpo-
rate form by high-tech start-ups that receive venture capital funding. The
puzzle, explored at length by Joseph Bankman in a 1994 article, is that this
choice is an expensive one on the tax front for venture capital firms because
it forgoes predictable tax savings that could be realized were the recipient
of the investment organized as a partnership.' Such tax savings likely
exceed the costs of converting a partnership or an LLC to corporate form
prior to an initial public offering of the firm's stock. s  Professor
Bankman's article examines several possible explanations for the organiza-
tional structure of start-ups that comprise portfolio investments for venture
capital firms and finds no single answer to the pattern.36 The puzzle is
especially intriguing because venture capital investors may safely be as-
sumed to be sophisticated, to be able to retain highly skilled legal and
financial advisors, and to be in a strong position to bargain for an organiza-
tional form that best achieves their interests as investors. One possible
explanation that is not considered in Professor Bankman's article is the
formally undifferentiated governance structure contemplated by partnership
and LLC statutes. Observed patterns in venture capital investing support
this hypothesis. Most venture capital firms in the United States are struc-
tured as limited partnerships with a management company as general
partner. 7 The terms of a stock purchase agreement define the relationship
34. Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L. REV.
1737, 1738-39 (1994). In particular, choosing the corporate form sacrifices pass-through
tax treatment of the firm's losses.
35. Id. at 1749-50.
36. See id. at 1749-66. The explanations discussed include the special tax circum-
stances of corporations that make venture capital investments an uncommon occurrence in
the United States, the unattractiveness to some investors of the benefits provided by
investments that yield tax losses, the prospect that venture capitalists are innately optimists
with gamblers' mentalities, and the impact of tradition on both venture capitalists and
managers in portfolio firms.
37. See Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Market for Innovation in the United States and Japan:
Venture Capital and the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate, 91 Nw. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1997) (manuscript at 30-31, on file with author); see also Paul Gompers &
Josh Lerner, The Use of Covenants: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Partnership Agree-
ments, 39 J.L. & ECON. 463, 469 (1996). The structure of venture capital funds resembles
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between the venture capital firm and the recipient of its investment. Most
stock purchase agreements structure the venture capital investment as a
purchase of convertible preferred stock;38 a part of the deal is the venture
capitalist's right to participate in the governance of the portfolio company
by electing one or more directors to its board.39 Indeed, the number of
that of funds that finance leveraged buyouts. The fund's general partner receives a percent-
age of its profits, which typically has been 20% in venture capital agreements. Some funds
recently have demanded a higher percentage share, which alienated some pension fund
investors. See From Labs to Riches, ECONOMIST, Nov. 9, 1996, at 87. Over 80% of the
investment into venture capital funds now comes from institutional investors. Id.
The identity of investors in venture capital funds suggests additional tax-related
explanations for the observed pattern. The partnership structure of a venture capital firm
should make the tax situation of its investors a significant factor in how the firm structures
the businesses in which it invests. Under current tax law, it is not attractive for a tax-
exempt investor or a foreign investor to receive a distributive share of the income of an
unincorporated firm, including an LLC. See Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability
Company: A Catalyst Exposing the Corporate Integration Question, 95 MICH. L. REv. 393,
425 (1996). The Internal Revenue Code taxes the receipt of such income as unrelated busi-
ness income for the tax-exempt investor, see I.R.C. §§ 512-513 (1994), while a tax-exempt
investor would pay no taxes at all on dividends on corporate stock. Tax treaties between
the United States and foreign countries generally result in lower tax rates for dividends on
corporate stock than for business income from other sources. See Hamill, supra, at 425.
As a consequence, concludes Professor Hamill, "growing businesses that find it necessary
to raise significant capital from the equity markets for the first time will be forced to use
the corporate form in order to reach the tax-exempt and foreign investors." Id.
38. See Milhaupt, supra note 37, (manuscript at 32).
39. Aspects of venture capital investing, including this one, may present conflicts of
interest between the venture capital firm and other equity holders. Directors elected by the
venture capital firm, like all directors, owe fiduciary duties to the corporation itself and to
all of its shareholders, but these specially chosen directors may press hard on behalf of the
interests of the venture capital firm, even when its interests diverge from those of other
equity holders. The venture capital firm may, for example, wish to retrieve its investment
so that it may invest in another prospect that is more promising. It is common to make the
preferred stock issued to the venture capital firm subject to mandatory redemption, see
Milhaupt, supra note 37, (manuscript at 33), a feature that would increase in value when
the start-up's prospects appear shakier. To protect its receipt of assets from the start-up
when redemption occurs, it is in the interest of the venture capital firm that the shaky-
looking start-up not undertake risky projects prior to the redemption. Even when those
projects have a high payoff potential, if their failure would lead to the start-up's insolvency
in temporal proximity to the redemption, the redemption would be in jeopardy of being
voidable as an impermissible distribution of assets to an equity holder. The venture capital
agreement may. also include a "drag along" clause, which enables the venture capital
investor to compel the other shareholders to sell their interests if the venture capital firm has
received an offer acceptable to it. See FREDEMICK D. L!PMAN, VENTURE CAPITAL AND JUNK
BOND FINANCING 45 (1996). A "drag along" clause enables the venture capital firm to sell
to a purchaser that insists on acquiring all outstanding equity interests in the corporation.
It contemplates a forced sale, and thus a situation in which the interests or desires of the
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venture capitalists who serve on the board of a portfolio company tends to
increase during times of crisis, as manifested by turnover in the portfolio
company's chief executive officer.' Thus, the governance elements in the
venture capital deal appear to be significant. This conclusion is unsurpris-
ing given the degree of industry concentration present in most venture
capital firms' portfolios and their lack of market liquidity prior to a public
offering of portfolio companies' stock. Governance issues are especially
salient when an investment is relatively illiquid, even in deals that, like the
quintessential venture capital deal, are structured to facilitate the venture
capital firm's exit as an investor. 1
Considerable ingenuity could be expended on attempts to replicate the
governance structure created by corporate law in an unincorporated firm in
order to place the venture capitalist in an authoritative and informed posi-
tion to monitor management and to intervene when warranted without itself
undertaking the burdens - and liabilities - of direct operational manage-
ment. A differentiated monitoring function is not an expressly stated option
for the structures created under partnership statutes and under most LLC
statutes.4' Much less ingenuity is required to avail oneself of the predict-
able governance pattern embraced by the corporate form. It is also a less
risky choice for the investor's legal advisors. Attempting to create a
differentiated monitoring function in an LLC without the benefit of explicit
statutory guidance is a riskier endeavor for the investor's lawyer than using
the more predictable governance structure created by a corporate statute.43
venture capital firm diverge from those of other equity holders. Likewise, the venture
capital fim's interest in exiting from its investment through an initial public offering of the
start-up's stock or a sale of the start-up might lead its directors on the start-up's board to
press for such a transaction sooner rather than later, even when a later transaction might be
advantageous to all holders bf equity in the start-up. To be sure, the venture capital firm's
interest in its reputation may serve as an effective constraint on its pursuit of interests in
conflict with other equity holders.
40. See Josh Lerner, Venture Capitalists and the Oversight of Private Firms, 50 J. FIN.
301, 302 (1995).
41. See JACK S. LEViN, STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL, PRIVATE EQUITY, AND
ENTREPRENEURIAL TRANSACTIONS 18 (1994).
42. The Minnesota LLC statute is an intriguing exception. See supra note 30.
43. Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner explain that, for a variety of reasons, lawyers
who draft contractual and organizational documents may prefer to use standardized terms
over customized terms whose import is less certain. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner,
Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and
Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347 (1996). Even when the lawyer accurately
anticipates future contingencies and drafts language that addresses them appropriately, a
court may misinterpret or misapply the contractual provision. Moreover, the magnitude of
the negative impact on the lawyer's reputation as a drafter may exceed the magnitude of the
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To be sure, venture capital investing seems a relatively unlikely context for
parties to be locked into suboptimal organizational choices as a consequence
of lawyers' risk aversion. The business setting itself is one that should
induce innovation, not discourage it. Indeed, it is common for lawyers who
do venture capital work to agree to provide services initially for very low
cash fees, or no fees at all, in exchange for stock in the company' or in
anticipation of providing well-paid services later on if the firm succeeds.45
To the extent participants in this market continue to choose the corporate
form over theoretically available LLC structures, it may be because innova-
tion may not promise sufficient advantages over the customary structure.4
Moreover, if the customary structure works well enough in facilitating the
investment objectives of venture capital firms, it is plausible that those
firms would not themselves have identified the reasons why the customary
structure works as well as any likely alternative.'
negative impact on the client, in particular because the lawyer's career risk is undiversi-
fiable. Id. at 354-55. A good reputation as a drafter is more easily destroyed than created;
"[like a reputation for ethical behavior, a reputation as a contract lawyer may have to be
built on many successful contracts, while it may be ruined with only one failure." Id. at
358. A separate but related phenomenon is the reputed preference of transactional lawyers
for solutions to clients' needs that are less rather than more likely to eventuate in litigation.
Edward Rubin reports that within law firms, transactional lawyers often regard themselves
as having failed when one of their "matters" becomes a "case" to be referred to the firm's
separate litigation department. See Edward L. Rubin, The Nonjudicial Life of Contract.
Beyond the Shadow of the Law, 90 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 107, 111-12 (1995). Moreover, if an
innovation in contractual or organizational structuring succeeds, it is not protectible as
intellectual property by the transactional lawyer. These arguments do not, of course,
establish that such innovation never occurs - manifestly it does - just that its occurrence
may be inhibited.
44. Lisa Bernstein, The Silicon Valley Lawyer as Transaction Cost Engineer?, 74 OR.
L. REV. 239, 247 & n.37 (1995). In Professor Bernstein's assessment, this contingent fee
structure enhances the entrepreneur's reputation in the eyes of venture capital firms.
45. Venture Capitalists: A Really Big Adventure, ECONOMIST, Jan. 25, 1997, at 20,
21.
46. In particular, current tax law makes noncorporate structures unattractive for many
investors who presently fund venture capital pools. See supra note 37. Organizational inno-
vation is unlikely to occur unless venture capital firms wish to attract additional types of
investors.
47. Venture capital relationships in Silicon Valley, and lawyers' roles in facilitating
them, may have distinctive qualities that may not be prevalent elsewhere. In Silicon Valley,
lawyers serve the financial brokerage function of bringing client entrepreneurs together with
venture capital firms. See Bernstein, supra note 44, at 245. One law firm alone controls
access to 40%-60% of available capital. Id. at 246. Most lawyers in Silicon Valley
encourage the parties to use one of three standardized agreements. Id. at 248. Finally, it
appears not to be unusual for the same lawyer to represent both the venture capital fund and
the entrepreneur. Id. at 248-49 n.43. Whatever implications should be drawn from a
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The significance of corporate governance rights to venture capital
investors also helps to explain the use of convertible preferred stock, as
opposed to convertible debt, as the basic financing vehicle. As an equity
investment, convertible preferred stock affords less protection against
downside risk than would convertible debt, but it is a preferable vehicle to
generate rights to achieve participation in corporate governance through the
election of directors.' Negotiated covenants in privately placed debt
securities can enable a lender to monitor the debtor's financial condition
and review major business decisions; tightly drawn financial and business
covenants may enable the lender to veto transactions and thus facilitate
negotiations between the lender and the borrower's management over
elements of business decisions that are relevant to the risks borne by the
lender. These contractually based rights, significant though they may be
in many instances, are not equivalent to an internal role in firm gover-
nance. 9 Only internal participants may initiate transactions that bind the
pattern of dual representation, one is not that the standard agreements underserve the
interests of venture capital funds.
48. Debt securities that carry voting rights also carry the risk of subordination in the
event their issuer enters bankruptcy, as well as the risk that the creditor will be perceived
to have exercised such control over the debtor's management that it becomes liable to other
creditors as the principal on whose behalf the debtor incurred obligations. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) oF AGENCY § 14 0 (1958). Additionally, using an equity structure for the
venture capital investment does not result in debt reflected on the books of the start-up firm,
which might make it more attractive to prospective lenders and to prospective purchasers
of common stock. The preferred equity structure is also desirable if the start-up firm is not
expected to generate significant earnings in its early years because the dividend preference
does not create any contractual obligation to pay a dividend. Debt securities with a fixed
coupon - a fixed obligation to pay interest at periodic intervals - create a contractual
obligation to make the payments when due. Zero-coupon debt, in contrast, does not create
such an obligation, but it generates taxable income for the debtholder on imputed interest
over the lifetime of the obligation. See I.R.C. §§ 1272-73 (1994). Finally, an equity-based
structure presents fewer conflicts than does a debt-based investment between the venture
capital firm and the portfolio company's management, whose compensation typically
includes a significant equity component consisting of stock options. Apart from these
analytically separable factors, experienced commentators explain the predominance of equity
structures by reference to the risk preference or investing style of venture capital firms.
They seek "geometric returns when the portfolio company is successful" and "would not
purchase debt interests simply to obtain an interest yield." See LEVIN, supra note 41, at 19.
Returns on venture capital investing are highly variable. Last year, the average venture
capital fund returned an average of 54.2% to its investors, whereas the average return over
the past decade was 13.5%. From Labs to Riches, supra note 37.
49. A lender that achieved such a position would incur the risks associated with
holding de facto equity. See supra note 48. Consider a lender that conditions its willing-
ness to lend on the borrower's acceptance of the lender's provision of pervasive management
consulting services under a contract that, one way or another, has been structured to make
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firm. Even holders of debt securities convertible into equity are in an
external position until they convert or until the firm defaults.' Factors
apart from governance may explain the observed pattern of venture capital
investing, but the governance choices of sophisticated investors able to
negotiate for terms that best serve their interests warrant reflection. In
particular, these choices prompt tentative skepticism about the wisdom of
organizational statutes that facilitate organizational agreements with terms
that provoke wonder that any rational person could, knowing the terms,
nonetheless decide to invest.
Conclusion
Bernard Berenson's assessment aside, the Vision of St. Eustace contin-
ues to hold our interest. For one thing, it leads us to wonder what might
happen next. Will the dog catch the hare? Will the other dogs mobilize
themselves? Will St. Eustace's instincts for the hunt overtake his immedi-
ate religious experience? The relative sizes of the stag and the religious
vision suggest that the Saint's interests as a hunter soon may dominate.
Similarly, unincorporated firms demonstrate the intrinsic interest of human
unpredictability. With functions undifferentiated, and in the absence of a
formal centralizing hierarchy that might constrain behavior, much can
happen that would be less likely in a more structured organization.
It remains to be seen whether the governance characteristics heretofore
typified by the corporate form can successfully be replicated in a
noncorporate structure. These characteristics help explain the investment
choices of venture capital firms, which invest in portfolio firms organized
as corporations (not partnerships) and which mostly invest in preferred
equity securities, not debt. LLC statutes, formally inviting as they are to
contractual innovation, create the theoretical possibility of replicating the
corporate-style differentiation of a monitoring function from operational
management. Venture capital firms structure investment relationships
through legal forms that create significant rights in firm governance. If
these rights are valuable, sophisticated investors are not likely to experiment
with organizational innovations that carry uncertain governance conse-
quences.
it highly unattractive for the borrower to breach the contract or decline to follow the advice.
If the management consulting advice is "advice" that the borrower cannot refuse, the lender
appears to have departed from a contractually grounded external posture and to have become
an internal participant in firm governance.
50. See Alexander J. Triantis & George G. Triantis, Conversion Rights and the Design
of Financial Contracts, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1231, 1252-53 (1994).
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Theoretically plausible though my account may be, caution warrants
this final concluding point. Berenson's critique of the Vision of Saint
Eustace illustrates a pitfall of scholarly self-confidence, which the critique
manifests to a degree that some might perceive as hubris. Berenson's work
reflects a scholarly and aesthetic paradigm that would strike many contem-
porary observers as woefully dated and narrow. Much contemporary art
is, in its own way, just as flat and unhierarchial as Pisanello's, and many
contemporary audiences value primitive as well as contemporary works for
precisely that quality of untutored and unstructured enthusiasm which
Berenson so firmly disparaged. Berenson's work as an art historian
brought new rigor to attribution and had an enduring impact on the profes-
sion's standards and practice."' It has proven less vulnerable over time than
have his aesthetic judgment and taste. Styles of explanation in legal schol-
arship, like styles of art criticism, inevitably reflect their era and its domi-
nant explanatory paradigms, and accordingly, such styles are vulnerable to
subsequent shifts in taste as well as to subsequent evolutions in knowledge.
The choice among available organizational structures implicates complex
patterns of human interactions; custom, past practice, and interpersonal
relationships may explain many such choices to a degree that eludes capture
by tightly drawn theoretical models.
51. See ERNEST SAMUELS, BERNARD BERENSON: THE MAKING OF A CONNOISSEUR
(1979).
